



International Institute of Certified Public Accountants

Incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware

28 July 2012

To

Dr. Mark J. Carney
Governor
Bank of Canada
234 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON K1A 0G9
Canada

And to

The Hon. James M. Flaherty, PC, MP
Minister of Finance
Department of Finance Canada
140 O'Connor Street
Ottawa, ON K1A 0G5
Canada

Dear Dr. Carney
Dear Mr. Flaherty:

Liquid Money — The Final Thing. Federal Reserve and Central Bank Accounts for Everyone

I copy you on a proposal that I sent to your US, UK and Euro Area counterparts because I am a Canadian citizen..

At present Canada's financial system, in particular its chartered banks, seem to suffer less from the Global Financial Crisis' debacle; but the banks rely heavily on foreign currency financing, but the Canadian dollar is rising against the US dollar, a situation not cast in stone or FX receipts from the sale of crude oil from Alberta's tar sands.

Book sent to you under separate cover

I am sending you under separate cover my new publication, "Liquid Money – The Final Thing. Federal Reserve and Central Bank Accounts for Everyone." 134 pages, illustrated, ISBN 978-1478312239. This booklet has also been sent to your American, UK and *Eurosystem* counterparts along with nearly identical cover letters.

ICB's proposal of ring-fencing retail banks

I make the argument that ring-fencing retails banks as recommended by Sir John Vicker's UK's Independent Commission on Banking is a step in the right direction by re-enacting the American Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, unwittingly repealed through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 under President Bill Clinton, although it had been said that Glass-Steagall was already a dead letter.

Accounting fraud

I argue that ring-fencing does not cure the principle fault of the banking system, namely, the monetary financial institutions (MFI's, the European Central Bank's

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name for the private commercial banks) continue to create demand deposits that are NOT money and can transfer only by way of offset in the daily payments clearing. This quasi money is always unacceptable when businesses experience downturns, and ALWAYS over the past 80 years these money creating banks that — as Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison on January 1, 1815, “I sincerely believe the banking institutions having the issuing power of money are more dangerous to liberty than standing armies” — fail at one time or another.

I accuse that banking supervisors are incompetent, perpetuating a system that was known to be flawed since Jefferson’s letters were published, since thousands of banks failed every few decades, and there is NO end in sight.

Money created by bookkeeping, debiting loans receivable, crediting demand deposits, is plain and simple accounting perversion (if not a “fraud”). I am a Certified Public Accountant in the State of Washington, and I am sticking my neck out, so to speak, making this accusation against the standard setters FASB and IASB, and against the accounting profession auditing the banks. I have corresponded with Board Member Jim Leisenring, but to no avail. The stakes are high, and admission of error would cause a tsunami, if misunderstood, although the process to cure the defect is simple. The entire argument is in my book which you are receiving.

Liquid Money

I make the further argument, saying that every person has the right to receive, hold, and to dispose of legal tender money issued by the central bank(s), but is barred, yeah openly discriminated against in violation of the equal treatment clauses in the constitutions and human rights conventions, from holding deposit balances at these central banks.

The discrimination, which in the case of Germany was imposed against the third largest insurer, Talanx AG, to open an account with the Bundesbank allowed under Art. 19 of the Bundesbankgesetz, not only protects the monopoly of private commercial banks to operate like private mints, but puts the entire monetary and payment system of the nation (and most of the world) constantly at an unexplained, unjustified risk.

I show in my booklet, “Liquid Money — The Final Thing,” that the process of transferring private bank deposits to the central banks is so simple that the mind is repelled, does not increase a nation’s or currency area’s money supply, and is therefore completely sterile as to price inflation.

I am proposing three options, Option I being the most desirable, namely in a nut shell:

Accounts at the Bank of Canada for Everyone

1. Everyone, individual or juristic entity, is entitled to maintain a current account at the central bank (“central bank account” or “CBA”) or its branches to make deposits and withdrawals in any amount as well as payments by way of transfer, in accordance with the fee schedule published by the central bank.

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2 The central bank may pay interest on deposits, or not pay interest.

Bank of Canada Act

I believe that paragraph g) in combination with (p) of Article 18 of the Bank of Canada Act, read together with the Preamble, is an authority to for the Bank of Canada to allow Canadians to have accounts at the bank. If not, a Governor's directive may clarify the issue for the benefit of the public.

Result of Option I

If Option I is exercised, allowing the public — natural and legal persons — to open current accounts at the central bank of their country, drawing down their balances at these private commercial banks — if the banks did nothing by making deposits attractive enough for depositors to stay or redeposit their new central bank funds — then bankruptcy of the banks would be the result and very little would money would actually be transferred because the banks don't have the legal tender money.

Solution to Lack of Liquidity:

Central banks assume deposits held at commercial banks

At the request of the commercial bank's depositor to transfer his deposit to the central bank, the central bank would credit the person's account at the central by assuming the person's deposit balance(s) at the private commercial bank(s).

The commercial bank would be required to pay interest on the assumed deposit to the central bank at a rate of interest set by the central bank. The deposit of the central bank at the private commercial bank would be redeemable in central bank funds at any time the private commercial bank so chooses and can do so, or if tardy the central bank would put the private commercial bank on a realistic repayment schedule.

The balance sheets of the central bank and the commercial banks would reflect the transfers of deposit as follows:

The Central Bank

<u>Assets</u>		<u>Liabilities</u>	
Due from Bank A	100,000	Deposit Customer 111	100,000
Due from Bank B	200,000	Deposit Customer 222	200,000
Due from Bank C	300,000	Deposit Customer 333	300,000
Etc.		Etc.	

Private Commercial Banks:

Bank A

<u>Assets</u>	<u>Liabilities</u>
	Due to Central Bank 100,000
	Deposit Customer 111 0

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Bank B

<u>Assets</u>	<u>Liabilities</u>	
	Due to Central Bank	200,000
	Deposit Customer 222	0

Bank C

<u>Assets</u>	<u>Liabilities</u>	
	Due to Central Bank	300,000
	Deposit Customer 333	0

Inflation sterile — No change in money supply

The money supply before the transfer of deposits to the central bank including deposits at the private commercial banks, and after the transfer of deposits to the central bank (now including the public's deposits at the central bank) is unchanged. The result is merely a switch in liabilities from the insolvency-ridden private commercial banks to the always solvent central bank(s).

Persons may redeposit central bank funds with private commercial banks

Private commercial banks may be interested in having their deposit customers retransfer their central bank deposits with them to gain high-power central bank money to bolster their liquidity. Such a depositor's private bank deposit would, of course, not be as safe and solvent as at the central bank, and the private bank would need to pay a risk premium in the form of a highly competitive interest rate, or deposit insurance if the FDIC were to continue its operations.

In fact, these redeposited funds, which should not be labeled deposits but "investments," would be the ones that can be lent out safely without risk of bringing down the banking system if the borrower defaulted, even if borrowers defaulted *en masse*. In case of borrower-default, the lending bank would become insolvent, the "investor's" at the private commercial bank "investment" would be impaired (or even lost) due to bankruptcy of the bank, but the money in circulation would be unaffected; would simply be in other peoples' pockets or accounts at banks' whose demand deposits are 100% covered by central bank funds, the same funds that the lender had initially deposited.. This is not the situation today before the reform, because 90% of the money supply is in the form of quasi money at individual banks and cannot transfer for lack of offset capability during business downturns.

Continued management of the loan by the private commercial banks

The private banks ought to remain liable for the deposits they have created and should continue to manage their loan account, paying interest to the central bank, and continue to be 'on the hook' until the CB's deposit is redeemed.

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The threat to the banks posed by the public's ability to move their demand deposits to the central bank the very moment a bank had made a loan out of nothing by double entry bookkeeping, would drain the bank's liquidity and push the bank into bankruptcy.

The threat of a liquidity squeeze at commercial banks resulting from lending and creating quasi money is necessary to begin to reign in and contain the amount of risk-taking that has occurred in the past two hundred and fifty year, and to put an end to commercial banks' ability to create quasi money out of nothing. The ability of the public to bank at the central bank is enough of a threat to the private commercial banks to stop their old practice; no new law and regulations are needed to accomplish the desired effect.

Prudent liquidity-conscious banks, and they must all be, will expand and contract their loan portfolio in tandem with their savings deposit accounts, requiring notice of withdrawal which maturities aligned with the bank's realistic ability to call in loans for redemption. Or the bank would cease to be a deposit-taking institution all together and convert to a finance company.

As already mentioned, it would be important to amend the Federal Reserve Act, disallowing the Federal Reserve Banks to maintain accounts with private commercial banks. In the past this was desirable for the government as a way of acquiring and spending the private banks' quasi money resulting from the sale of government securities.

Quantitative easing:

Expansion of the money supply by interest-free borrowing and government-spending

The bank's being cautious in creating demand deposits without backing of central bank money, the nation's money supply may not increase sufficiently with central bank money (interest-free) to meet the demands for money in times of economic expansion, unless federal funds are created to be available.

This is a an opportunity for the government to fund itself in a closed operation interest-free by depositing its securities at to the central bank, which credits the Treasury with the proceeds to spend into circulation as needed for defense, medical care, transportation, education, housing, and so on, increasing the money supply sufficiently to avoid price deflation without creating price inflation, a coordinated function that was previously a more uncoordinated one of the private commercial banks supported by central bank open-market-operations.

In the alternative, the central bank can monetize existing national debt securities held by the private sector by calling the securities for redemption or buying them outright in the market place, increasing the money supply while decreasing the national debt.

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Other benefits to the public and the national debt

With banks' ability to manufacture quasi money curtailed, the money supply can be increased by public spending, the central bank buying government debt certificates, and the government treasury departments spending the proceeds into circulation, the times for the federal government's need to borrow in the capital markets should be over.

Deposit insurance

Under this Option I, deposit insurance is no longer needed to attract depositors' funds for deposit, because deposits at the central bank are always solvent. If persons choose to deposit their funds at private commercial banks as "investments", they will do so at their own risk. As shown above, should a private commercial bank fail, the central bank money on deposit will not be affected, and the national payment system will not be at risk from a bank failure.

The CDIC Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation may continue to guarantee "investment accounts" up to their limit per customer per bank, but there is no systemic need to do so once investors understand that interest paid by private commercial banks includes the premium for the risk of default. Those who cannot learn may loose.

Basel III

The misconception of equity capital and its irrelevance for banking institutions

The rare but good banking news these days come from the United Kingdom and Governor King's continuing support of Sir Vicker's recommendations. Even Sandy Weill ex-CEO of Citibank is accepting for the United States, saying the it would make the private banks more profitable ("Former Citigroup CEO Weill Says Banks Should Be Broken Up" by Donal Griffin and Christine Harper, Bloomberg online, Jul 26, 2012). But it is not enough. Although Basel III finally adopts liquidity standards, it upholds the misconceived capital adequacy standard, difficult to comply with, needless, ineffective, miscoceived and insulting to the intellect.

You may hold against that Canada is special, and it is having only a handful of chartered banks running the banking system of which I was a part as a young corporate credit officer at the Bank of Nova Scotia Toronto general office in charge of large credit applications from three Western provinces. This was some time ago.

If you can agree with me, I believe that Canada is not immune to risks caused by misfortune or other events. The system can be improved and should be improved "while the going seems to be good", so to speak.

Concerned citizens' groups may raise the money and banking issues including the reduction of Canada's national debt under the plan to a political level at federal elections, or a straight-forward legal one, if the federal government and the Bank of Canada are shown to be disinterested. If the reduction of the national debt is not seen

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as pressing from a systemic point of view, an argument could and should be made that it is the austerity measures in the federal budget that hurt the people, and could be avoided by a reduction of interest payments on the national debt resulting from the plan.

With all the great financial men that England and Scotland have produced (even considering John Law's debacle at the Banque Royal in France and what was learned), I am still ashamed of the ignorance of the world's learned and distinguished academic people, in particular of many economists who are hired to run our central banks, and also private Deutsche Bank by Prof. Josef Ackermann; their ignorance not in Keynesian theories how money creation and distribution benefits economic growth, but ignorance about the mechanics of the banking system which is based on accounting (transaction recognition, measurement, and reporting) and nothing else.

Unlike the London goldsmith bankers of old, our banks today are glorified accounting offices, and that function should be completely understood before policies are thought out, pronounced and adopted, including the misconception of equity capital to protect deposits. They never have, because capital is a measure, an abstract, difference between assets and liabilities, not an account from which one can draw anything out and pay off depositors. Still Basel III is hailed as the grail of bank stability... as if a bank were an industrial concern, which it is not.

A bank is effectively a service provider like a law firm, an accounting office keeping records, without power of construction, but the ever present risk of destruction from malpractice.

With all best wishes,

SIGNED

Michael Schemmann, PhD, CPA, CMA
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Director of the IICPA